RECENT CASES
BILLS AND

NOTEs-AccommODATION

INDORSER-EFFECT

OF

RECEIVING

VALUE FOR LOAN OF NAME-Defendant indorsed three notes totalling $26,667
at the request of the plaintiff payee so as to facilitate their negotiability. Plaintiff agreed to pay the defendant $1,667 for the indorsements by crediting that
amount on one of the notes as having been received by him. Suit was brought
on two of these notes by the plaintiff payee against the defendant indorser.
Held, that defendant was an accommodation indorser and suit could not, therefore, be maintained. Carr v. Wainwright, decided by C. C. A. 3rd Circuit, U. S.
Daily, Sept. 9, 1930, at 2116.
Leading text authorities seem agreed that at common law to constitute one
an accommodation party, the loan of credit upon the instrument had to occur
without any consideration moving to him.' Cases which arose prior to the
adoption of the Uniform; Negotiable Instruments Law in the various states also
enunciated this principle.' Neither the text writers nor the cases, however, indicate whether the principle that there must be an absence of consideration referred to consideration for the instrument or to consideration for the loan of the
name. Almost immediately after the appearance of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, the section which defines who shall be deemed an accommodation party'
was assailed" because of the ambiguity and uncertainty created by the words,
"without receiving value therefor" and their omission was recommended
It
was anticipated that the question as to whether value could not be given for
the loan of the name or merely for the instrument which had not arisen prior to
the Negotiable Instruments Law would arise following its adoption. It was
urged, moreover, that one could receive value for the lending of his credit or
name and remain an accommodation party.7 One of the framers of the Negotiable Instruments Law, in defining this section maintained that no uncertainty
existed concerning it and seemed to indicate that one could not be an accommoda2I PARSONS, NOTES AND BILLS (1871) 183; 2 RANDOLPH, COMMERCIAL
PAPER (1888) §472; BYLES, BILS (8th ed. 1891) 131; I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE)
INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1891) § i89; TIEDEMAN, COM61MERCIAL PAPER (I889)
§ 158; NORTON, BILLS AND NOTES (2d ed. 1896) 173. But see NoaroN, op. cit.

supra (4th ed. 1914) 236 n. 23.

' Greenway v. Orthwein Grain Co., 85 Fed. 536, 537 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898);
Miller v. Larned, 1o3 Ill. 562, 570 (1882) ; Peale v. Addicks, 174 Pa. 543, 34 Atl.
2oi (1896) ; First Nat. Bk. of Vienna v. Engebretson, 28 S. D. 185, 193, 132
N. W. 786, 790 (1911).
'UNrFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 29.

'Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law (19oo) 14 H.Mv.L. REV. 241, 248.
Supra note 4, at 248; Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A Word
More (19oi) 14 HARv. L. REV. 442, 445; McKeehan, The Negotiable Ii triments Law (A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy) (1902) 50 Am. L.
REG. (n. s.) 449, 509; Mack, Some Suggestions on the Proposal to Enact the
"Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law" in Illinois (19o7) I I.z. L. REv. 592,
597. In the Illinois Law this phrase is omitted from the section defining an
accommodation party, Iu. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1925) 1668, § 49.
Supra note 5.
Ames, stira note 5, at 455; McKeehan, supra note 5,at 5o9. The illustration given by Dean Ames fits the instant case exactly.
0

(8S)
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tion party if consideration were received for the use of the name.' The Negotiable Instruments Law fails to express with sufficient clarity which of the two
views it adopts. The phrase "without receiving value therefor" has had judicial
construction prior to the instant case 9 and as in this decision was construed to
refer to value for the negotiable instrument and not value for the use of the
name or the loan of credit' This view was at an earlier time accepted' in interpreting a similar section of the English Act defining an accommodation
party. ' The principal case points out, moreover, that as a matter of construction, the grammatical antecedent of "value therefor" must be the word "instrument" and not "for the lending of his name" which does not precede but follows "value therefor." The decision in the instant case being sound both in
point of logic and as a matter of business policy should, added to the few former
cases holding similarly, create a sufficient body of authority to assure a uniform
interpretation of this section of the statute.

CoNFLicT OF LAws-WoRKMEN'S COMPENSATION-Plaintiff, employee of a

Massachusetts corporation which was building a road in New York, was injured
while working in the employer's sand pit in Canada where all of the employee's
work was to be performed. The employee was a resident of Canada. Held,
that the injuries were not compensable under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law' The test in all cases is the place where the employment is
located. Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 169 N. E. 622 (N. Y. 193o).
When it is remembered that the rise of the Workmen's Compensation Acts
is comparatively recent and that principles in the field of conflict of laws are but
now assuming a definite form, it is not surprising to note the varying results
which have been reached in different courts, when, under a Compensation Act,
recovery is sought in the state of employment for an injury suffered beyond the
borders of that state.' Where the statute has, in express terms, provided for
8
Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Ipstruments Law (i9oI) 1o YALE
L. J. 84, 86; Brewster, A Rejoinder to Dean Ames (i9Ol) 15 HARv. L. REv.
26, 32; McKeehan, supra note 5, at 5og. The entire series in the Ames-Brewster-McKeehan Controversy is collected in BRANNON, NEGoTILB INSTRUMENTS LAW (3d ed. 1919) 418 et seq.
9
The McGhee Inv. Co. v. Kirsher, 71 Colo. 137, 2o4 Pac. 89I, (1922);

Gruber v. Klein et al., 102 CorM. 34, 127 Adt. 907 (1925) ; Morris County Brick

Co. v. Austin, 79 N. J. L. 273, 75 Atl. 550 (1910).
0 Mr. McKeehan's prediction that proper care in interpretation would avoid
difficulties was correct and Dean Ames! fear of the consequences of allowing the
disputed phrase to remain in the section was not fulfilled.
' Cohen, Letter on the Negotiable Instruments Law (igo1) 15 HAI~v. L.
REV. 38.
' BiLLs OF EXCHANGE ACT, 45 and 46 Vict. c. 71, §28 (x882).

'N. Y. Cors. LAWS (I923) c. 67; see GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF

LAWS (1927)

202-206.

IIt has been suggested that the tendency of the law has been toward the
territorial rather than the personal, Gould v. Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 480, io2 N. E.
693 (1913) ; GENERAL SURvEY OF CONTINENTAL LEGAL HisTORY (1912) 80-83.

In this field the tendency has been to the contrary, see infra notes 3, 5, 6.
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recovery regardless of the situs of the injury, the literal words have been fol3
lowed and an award made; the words of the act have likewise been followed
application to injuries inflicted within the state.'
restricted
the
when they have
It is under acts which, as that of New York in the instant case, do not expressly
state the extent of their application, that the division of opinion arises. In those
states having an optional act, that is, one in which the parties may or may not
elect to be subject to its provisions, the great majority permit recovery whether
the employment be wholly or partially within or without the state,' upon the
theory that the duty to compensate in case of injury becomes an element in the
contract of employment. However, in those states having a compulsory act "
awards are usually restricted to cases in which the work outside of the state
borders has been at least incidental to an employment within the state.' Inasmuch as in jurisdictions with such compulsory acts, the duty to compensate can8
not logically be considered an element of the contract, and a construction o.f the
words of the act to cover all injuries whether within or beyond the state appears
impossible, this distinction, in the latter category, seems sound. There are,
however, distinct disadvantages in letting the employee look to his remedy only
in the state where he was injured. It may be difficult to secure service upon the
employer;' the modern employer with employees throughout the country will
experience difficulty and uncertainty in the ascertainment of and conformity to
the laws to which he is subject; and the judicial machinery of one jurisdiction
is often ill-adapted for enforcement of another's law. A consideration of these
Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Comm., 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. lO21
(192o) ; Hagenback and Wallace Co. v. Peppert, 66 Ind. App. 261, 117 N. E.
531 (1917) (the right being contractual accompanies the employee wherever he
goes and abides with him till contract of service is ended) ; SToRY, CONFLICT OF
LAws (8th ed. 1883) 375.
'NEv.: NEv. STAT. (I911) c. 183, §3; PA.: 1915 P. L. 736, § i, PA. STAT.
(West, 1920) § 21916.
IPettiti v. Pardy Const. Co., 103 Conn. 1ol, 13 Atl. 70 (1925) (wholly
without) ; Hulswit v. Escanaba Co., 218 Mich. 331, 188 N. W. 411 (1922) Bird,
J., at 333, "It would hardly be consistent to hold that by reason of the contract
relation, the act would apply to services partially performed outside, but would
exclude cases where the services were entirely performed outside of the state."
Acc.: McGuire v. Phelan-Sherly Co., Iii Neb. 6o9, 197 N. W. 615 (1924)
(wholly outside); Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R. I. 447, 98 Atl. 103 (1916);
Contra: Union Bridge Co. v. Ind. Comm., 287 Ill. 396, 122 N. E. 6o (1919);
Gould v. Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 480, io2 N. E. 693 (1913).
'In these jurisdictions, where the foreign employment is but incidental to
the main employment, recovery will be permitted. Matter of Post v. Burger &
Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, III N. E. 351 (1916) (injury in N. J. in employment
incidental to that in N. Y.); Madderns v. Fox Film Corp., :o5 App. Div. 791,
2oo N. Y. Supp. 344 (1923) ; aff'd, 237 N. Y. 614, 143 N. E. 764 (1924).
rAltman v. N. D. Comm. Bureau, 50 N. D. 215, 195 N. W. 287 (1923) (no
recovery though premium was calculated on payroll of total number of employees in and out of state); Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 224 N. Y. 9,
uI9 N. E. 878 (1918) in connection with which see Smith v. Heine Boiler Co.,
119 Me. 552, 112 Atl. 516 (i921) ; see Union Bridge Co. v. Ind. Comm., supra
note 5.
Recovery Under Workmen's Compensation Acts for Injury
'Angell,
31 HAiRv. L. REv. 6ig; GooDRlcH, locus cit. stupra note I.
Abroad (ii8)
'See Verdicchio v. McNab & Harlin Mfg. Co., 178 App. Div- 48, 164 N. Y.
Supp. 290 (1917) ; BRADBURY, WORKMAN'S COMPPENSATION (2d ed. 1914) 52.
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difficulties suggests the conclusion that, in these states, the adoption in their
statutes of provisions covering injuries occurring within or without the state
0
would permit a fuller accomplishment of the fundamental purpose of the acts

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE PowER-2EsTHTIc CoNsmERATINoNs A7PsiEu To BiIxzoARs-The Indianapolis board of park commissioners passed an

ordinance which prohibited the construction and ordered the destruction of all
billboards near parks. This ordinance was adopted under a statute which provided that park commissioners could regulate, abate, and forbid buildings or
"devices" near parks, but that no lawful business should be abated without compensation. The plaintiff advertising company applied for an injunction against
the enforcement of the ordinance, and raised among other points the constitutional objection that the ordinance took property solely for aesthetic purposes.
Held, that the ordinance was invalid because compensation was not granted as
required by the statute. The constitutional objection, however, was overruled.
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis,Department of Public
Parks, 172 N. E. 309 (Ind. 1930).
Courts have for many years refused to compel citizens to give up property
rights solely for the attainment of aesthetic objects even though the public as a
whole would have benefited thereby.' Under these decisions it has been generally argued that ",esthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence
rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of
the police power to take private property without compensation." I It was
anticipated that this attitude of law toward beauty would change.' The principal case is the most recent one that demonstrates the new and growing attitude.
The court reached its conclusion of overruling the constitutional objection by
saying that it was necessary for the protection of public health that msthetic
tastes be protected. Former decisions have treated aesthetic objects only as an
auxiliary consideration when there was some other separate and reasonable
relation to safety, health, morals, or general welfare.' The method of reasoning
in the principal case, therefore, marks a new step in the advancement of police
power in regard to billboards. No new principle of law is apllied but there is
'0 As to the constitutional power of the legislatures to enact such provisions,
see Matter of Post v. Burger and Gohlke, supra note 6 at 549, 111 N. E. at 352,
and citations supra note 3. If no recovery is available in the state of employment, recovery may usually be had under the law of the state of injury, Douthwright v. Champlin, 91 Conn. 524, IO At. 97 (1917)

(contract in Mass., recov-

ery in Conn.); Smith v. Heine Boiler Co. (Me.) supra note 7.
Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N. J. L. 285, 62 At. 267 (905);
Isenbarth v. Bartnett, 206 App. Div. 546, 143 N. E. 765 (N. Y. 1923); Bryan
v. City of Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 61 Atl. 894 (igo5).
'Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., supra note i, at 287.
3Chandler, The Attitude of The Law Toward Beauty (1922), 8 A. B. A. 3.
470.

' St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269, 39 Sup. Ct 274
(i'9l) ; Ayer v. Commissioners on Height of Buildings, 242 Mass. 30, 136 N. E.
.-338 (1922) ; Sign Works v. Training School, 249 IIl. 436, 94 N. E. 92o (19n).
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presented a new definition of the relation between public health and *esthetic
considerations. Police power is not an unalterable thing but changes within
constitutional limitations to meet new conditions. 5

HUSBAND
SUBSEQUENT

AND

WIFE-POSTNUPTIAL

CONTRACTS

OR GIFTS-EFFECT

OF

MISCONDUCT-Plaintiff purchased real estate with own earnings
and took deed jointly in the name of himself and of defendant, his wife, with
the intention that it should be used as their home. Plaintiff later obtained an
absolute divorce against defendant for subsequent adultery and now prays that
she be ordered to convey to plaintiff her right, title, and interest in the aforementioned premises. Held, that defendant convey the property to plaintiff.
Osborne v. Osborne, 40 F. (2d) 8oo (Ct. of App. D. C.I930).
The majority of the comparatively few cases on point uphold the view that
subsequent misconduct does not entitle the innocent spouse to set aside or avoid
a postnuptial transfer or gift which is valid in its inception, which contains
no express provisions that subsequent misconduct shall nullify it, and which is
not fraudulently induced.' In comparatively recent years, however, a new view
and consequent change in the law has developed, of which the instant case is a
culmination. The principles by which this new and directly opposite conclusion
of the law is reached, on facts similar to the instant case, are (I) that the
continued fidelity of the wife is an implied condition to the conveyance 2 and
consequently her misconduct causes a failure of consideration, and (2) that
because of the confidential relationship of the parties, the subsequent misconduct of the wife gives rise to a, constructive trust in favor of the husband.'
And although prior to the instant case there has been but one decision resting
squarely on either of the above theories,' there are numerous dicta' as well as
arguments of text authorities which support these principles The instant
'Cook v. Burnquist, 242 Fed. 321 (1917) ; The People v. Stokes, 281 Ill.
i59, 187 N. E. 87 (1917).
'Kinzey v. Kinzey, ii5 Mo. 496, 22 S. W. 497 (1893) ; Dixon v. Dixon,
23 N. J. Eq. 3X6 (1873); Finayson v. Finlayson, 17 Ore. 347, 21 Pac. 57
(i889) ; see Evans v. Carrington, 2 De G. F. & J. 481, 490 (186o) (separation
settlement).
2
See Evans v. Evans, ii8 Ga. 89o, 892, 45 S. E. 612, 613 (903) ; (I927)
27 COL L. Rxv. 6o8.
'Moore v. Moore, 278 Fed. 1017 (Ct. of App. D. C. i922) ; see Evans v.
Evans, upranote 2; Dickerson v. Dickerson, 24 Neb. 530, 39 N. W. 429 (i888);
Johnson v. Johnson, I Wash. 117, 124, 21o Pac. 382, 384 (1922).
' See Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525, 528, 17 Pac. 689, 69o (1888).
'Moore v. Moore, supra note 3, decided on the principle of an implied
condition.
aEvans v. Evans, supra note 2; Dickerson v. Dickerson; Johnson v. Johnson, both supra note 3; Brison v. Brison, supra note 4.
'On implied condition: (1922) 71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 81; (1927) 27 CoL
L. REv. 6o8. Contra: (923) 7 MINN. L. REv. 35o. On constructive trust:
I PmY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 209. "Whenever two persons

stand in such relation that confidence is necessarily imposed by one, and the
influence growing out of that fact is possessed by the other, and this confidence
is abused or the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense
of the confiding party, the party so availing himself of his position will not be
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case should be followed, at least in cases involving meretricious conduct, for
reasons of justice' and of .the sound public policy of supporting healthy marital
relations, both of which purposes will be advanced by the doctrine adopted
by this court.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACrOR-INJURY

To CUSTOMER DURING

REPAIRS To

SToaE-LAanmTy oF OwNxE-Owner employed independent contractor to repair

store. Store open during repairs. Due to negligence of contractor's employee,
customer was injured. Customer sued owner. Held, that owner is liable.
Lineaweaver v. Wancmaker, 299 Pa. 45, 149 Atl. 91 (193o).

It is well settled law that an employer cannot escape liability for the negligence of an independent contractor or his employees when he owes a duty
which the courts term "nondelegable." ' This duty may arise from a contractual
relation,2 from a statute' or charter,' or, in most jurisdictions, from the common
law 5 While a common law duty, in conjunction with charter or statutory
requirements, has in rare cases been held to be the basis for liability, 6 Pennpermitted to retain the advantage." Certainly in cases of postnuptial transfers
or gifts it would be no more than equitable to apply the rule of abused confidence
to the subsequent misconduct of the instant case as well as to prior misconduct.
And although the relationship of husband and wife does not raise a presumption
of the invalidity of a gift, Note (930)

78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 754, yet see

Turner v. Turner, 44 Mo. 535, 539 (1869), "A wife in whom her husband
reposed the strictest confidence might well be calculated to exert an influence on
his mind and obtain the title to property in her own name." Also see FRENCH
CIVm
CODE § 299.
8

Such a decision may seem unfair to the wife in cases where she has maintained a home for her husband while he has earned the money to purchase the
property which he then conveys to her. Yet as it would be too difficult for the
law accurately to make such distinctions, it is submitted that justice will be
arrived at more effectually by a consistent following, for either spouse, of the
rule of the instant case rather than by an adhering to the old rule. It must
always be remembered that the wife has deliberately placed herself in such a
position by her own misconduct.
ILuce v. Halloway, 156 Cal. i62,

1o3

Pac. 886 (igog); Paltry v. Eagen,

20o N. Y. 83, 93 N. E. 267 (igio); Sebeck v. Plaudeutsche Volkfert Verein,
64 N. J. L. 624, 46 Atl. 631 (I9OO); 2 MECHEm AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1918;
I THoMPsoN NEGLIGENCE (ist ed. igot) § 665.

'Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 184, 501 (1870) ; I THMPSON, op. cit.
supra
note I, §995.
3
Weber v. Buffalo R. Co., 2o App. Div. 292, 47 N. Y. Supp. 7 (1897) ;
I THOMPSON, op. cit. supranote I, §667.
' Chattanooga R. R. Co. v. Whitehead, 89 Ga. io, 45 S. E. 44 (1892) ;
I THOMPSON op. dt. supro note I, § 669.
sPooler v. Lumber Co., 113 Me. 426, 94 Atl. 754 (1915); Woodman v.
Metropolitan R. P-, 149 Mass. 335, 34o, 21 N. E. 482 (i889) ; Dean v. St. Paul

Union Depot Co., 41 Minn. 360, 43 N. W. 54 (i889) ; Corrigan v. Elsinger,
8i Minn. 42, 83 N. W. 492 (xgoo) (exactly parallel to case under discussion);
I THoMPsoN, op. cit supra note I, § 668.

Improvement Co. v. Rhoads, 1I6 Pa. 377, 9 Atl. 1o64 (x897) ; Gilmore v.

P. R. R., 154 Pa. 375, 25 Atl. 774 (1893) ; Norbeck v. Philadelphia, 224 Pa.
30, 73 Atl. 179 (19o9) ; Reichard v. Bangor Borough, 286 Pa. 25, 132 AtI. 803
(1926) ; Scott v. Erie City, 297 Pa. 344, 147 Atl. 68 (1929).
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sylvania in the past has very carefully confined itself to calling "nondelegable"
only those duties which find their origin in statutes or in the charters of the
corporations engaged in undertakings in which the public is said to have an
interest, thus holding liable for the negligent acts of independent contractors
7
8
railroads, turnpike companies, and in recent years municipal corporations. The
instant case holds nondelegable the duty of the storekeeper to protect his customers from unreasonable risks when he allows his store to remain open during
repairs. This is purely a common law duty;"o and Pennsylvania courts now
stand committed to the proposition that common law duties equally with those
How far this prinfounded on statutes and charters may be nondelegable.'
ciple may be carried is conjectural. Since common law duties of reasonable
care are no less important than those founded upon other considerations, the
present decision marks the advent into Pennsylvania of a humanly sound and
logically common sense principle of legal liability.

INTOXICATING

LIQUORS-MANDATORY

FoRFEITuR

UNDER THE NATIONAL

PROHIBITION AcT TO PROTECT INNOCENT THIRD PARTIs-The accused was
arrested under the National Prohibition Act for illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor.' Instead of proceeding under that statute, which protects innocent
lienors and owners, the vehicle was summarily forfeited under the Internal Revenue Statute for removing and concealing spirits with intent to defraud the
government of the tax.' Held, that arrest and seizure for illegal transportation
constitutes an election to proceed for forfeiture under the Prohibition Act.
Richbourg Motor Company, Intervener, Petitioner,v. United States, 281 U. S.
528, So Sup. Ct. 385 (1930).
The evolution of the forfeiture laws from the turmoil of these two inconsistent statutes has been retarded by opposing juristic factions,' one upholding
enforcement at the price of arbitrary forfeiture under the Revenue Statute,"
7Philadelphia W. & B. R. R. v. Hahn, 22 W. N. C. 32 (1888).

'Improvement Co. v. Rhoads, supra note 6.
'Norbeck v. Philadelphia, supra note 6; Reichard v. Bangor Borough,
supra note 6; Scott v. Erie City, supra note 6.
1°Reid v. Linck, 206 Pa. lO9, 55 AtI. 849 (19o3); Bloomer v. Snellenburg, 221 Pa. 25, 69 At. 1124 (igoS) ; Roff v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 269 Pa.
298, 112 Atl. 459 (i92I).
' See also Truby & Truby v. Nolan, 86 Pa. Super. 270 (1926).
141 STAT. 305, 315 (I919), 27 U. S. C. §40 (1928).

(1878), 26 U. S. C. § 1182 (Supp. 1928).
'For discussions and distinctions from both viewpoints, cf. Black, Some
Prohibition Forfeiture Cases-The Doctrine of Vicarious Liability (1930) 78
U. OF PA. L. REv. 518, with Buckley, Forfeiture of Vehicles for Unlawful
Movement of Liquor: Under the National Prohibition Act-Under the Revised
Statutes (1924) 4 B. U. L. REv. 183.
' Payne v. United States, 279 Fed. 122 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) ; United States
v. 385 Barrels, 30o Fed. 565 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
*REv.STAT. §3450
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the other, headed by Mr. Justice Stone, struggling to safeguard the interests of
innocent third parties under the National Prohibition Act 8 A temporary settlement of the conflict by holding the Revenue Statute impliedly repealed by the
Prohibition Act' lasted only until a Congressional clarifying act 7 inspired the
famous Ford Coupe Case, which increased the confusion by declaring both statutes operative. A conviction for illegal transportation was then declared an
election by the government to proceed for forfeiture under the Prohibition
ActY Mandatory procedure under the holding of the principal case would
seem to protect innocent parties in all cases where transportation is involved,
but actually the remedy is still contingent on conviction, which is a condition
precedent to forfeiturem Thus the rule, actually only changed frQm conviction
bars election to elecrion barred if conviction, withholds protection in a large
group of cases. Although the instant case has already been followed on its
facts by a Circuit Court of Appeals,' forfeiture has been upheld under harsher
statutes where proceedings for illegal transportation failed. A better holding,
'United States v. Brockley, 266 Fed. iooi (M. D. Pa. 1920) (National
Prohibition Act construed liberally to protect innocent owners as well as

lienors) ; United States v. Sylvester, 273 Fed. 253 (D. Conn. 192) ; McDowell
v. United States, 286 Fed. 521 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) ; United States v. Milstone,
6 F. (2d) 481 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1925).

"Section 35 of the National Prohibition Act, providing that "all provisions
of law that are inconsistent with this act are repealed only to the extent of
such inconsistency," should be construed in the light of the rule that later enactments repeal former ones practically covering the same acts, but fixing a lesser
penalty. United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S. 450, 41 Sup. Ct. 55i (192).
". ..

that all laws . . . in force when the National Prohibition Act was

enacted, shall be and continue in force, . . . except such provisions of such laws
as are directly in conflict with any provisions of the National Prohibition Act."
(Italics ours.) AN AcT SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE NATIONAL PROHIrrioN Acr,
42 STAT. 223 (1921), 27 U. S. C. § 3 (I926), af'd, United States v. Remus, 26o
U. S. 477 (1923).
'United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321, 47 Sup. Ct. 154, 47 A. L.
R. 1O25 (1926) (the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Stone, concurring in
part, was applied by him in the principal case) ; cf. dissenting opinion of Butler,
McReynolds and Sutherland, JJ., ibid. 335, and cases cited, ibid. 343n.
' Port Gardner Investment Company v. United States, 272 U. S. 564, 47
Sup. Ct. I65 (1926) (Mr. Justice Stone again separately concurred in part) ;
Commercial Credit Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 226, 48 Sup. Ct. 232 (1928)
(Mr. Justice Stone was not present).
"United States v. Slusser, 270 Fed. 818 (S. D. Ohio 1921) ; The Squanto,
13 F. (2d) 548 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); cf. United States v. One Fageol Truck,
17 F. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
'United States v. One Packard Motor Truck, 284 Fed. 394 (E. D. Mich.,
i92) (driver escaped arrest) ; United States v. Milstone, supra note 5 (car
abandoned) ; United States v. Walker, 41 F. (2d) 538 (D. Tenn. 193o) (seizure
by state officers). Contra,: United States v. Story, 294 Fed. 519 (C. C. A. 5th,
1923).

" United States v. One Whippet Sedan, 41 F. (2d) 496 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
' Aulksne v. United States, 5o Sup. Ct. 467 (930)
(review denied), for
discussion of which, see Williams, Forfeiture Laws (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 572;
United States v. One Mack Truck, 41 F. (2d) 849 (M. D_.Pa. 193o) (Not in

act of transportation).
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it is felt, would have expressly barred all election where transportation was
involvedI without suggesting the loose inference that the strength of the bar is
measured by the success of procedure n

JUDGMENT-ECOVERY

FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AS BAR TO AcTIoN FoR
ON INSURER SUBROGATED UNDER Pouc-After

PRoPERTY DAMAGE-EFFECT

insured had recovered from defendant for personal injuries, insurer, having
reimbursed insured for demolished car, sued defendant for the damage to the
car. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the right of action for the property
damage was entirely in insurer and was not merged in insured's judgment for
personal injuries. Le Blond Schacht Truck Co. v. Farm Bureau Mit. Automobile Ins. Co., I71 N. E. 414 (Ohio 1929).
Although the assertion has consistently been made that a cause of action
cannot be split,' courts have been in irreconcilable conflict in determining just
what constitutes a cause of action where personal and property torts have resulted from a single act of negligence. This has been caused by antipodal
viewpoints in approaching the problem 2 England 3 and a few American states'
have regarded the primary right invaded as the determining factor, maintaining
as distinct causes of action the separate torts resulting from the single act.
That the right of bodily security is fundamentally different from the right
to keep property intact is argued by pointing to the facts that entirely different
periods of statutory limitation are applied to each, and that claims for property
torts may be assigned while this is not true of personal torts. The majority of
American jurisdictions I do not deny this, but, prompted by the desire to mini"Other laws held inapplicable where transportation involved and no conviction possible. United States v. One Packard Motor Truck, supra note ii;
United States v. Milstone, supranote 5; Commercial Credit Co. v. United States,
33 F. (2d) 228 (C. C. A. 9th, i9M).
I "It is unnecessary to say whether, if for any reason the seizure cannot
be made or the forfeiture proceeded with, prosecution for any offense committed
must be had under the National Prohibition Act rather than other statutory
provisions." Stone, J., in principal case at 5o7.
'2 BLAcx, JUDGMENTS (2d ed. xpo2) § 734; 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (sth
ed. x925) § 596 (complete list of cases in notes).
'Brunsden v. Humphrey, r4 Q. B. D. i4I (1884) (Coleridge, C. J., dissenting). This is the leading case on the subject and illustrates very well the two
antithetical approaches to the question.
"Ibid.
'Clancy v. McBride, 338 Ill. 35, 169 N. E. 729 (1929); Smith v. Fisher
Baking Co., x47 At. 455 (N. J. 1929) ; Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., i7O
N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772 (I9O2) ; Wilson, Writs v. Rights: An Unended Contest
(1920) i8 MicH. L. REv. 255.
5
See Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., supra note 4, at 44, 62 N. E.
at 773.
6King v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 8o Minn. 83, 82 N. W. r113
(900);
Fields v. P. R. T. Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 Ad. 59 (1922); Sprague v. Adams,
139 Wash. 5io, 247 Pac. 96o (i926). Sce Clark, Joinder md Splitting of Causes
of Action (1927) 25 MIcH. L. REv. 393, 428.
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mize litigation,7 and preferring practical advantages to technical accuracy, so
long as the result is consonant with the requisites of justice,' view the act of
negligence as the determining factor and permit a single action to be brought,
with the separate rights named as items of damage? A desirable result is thus
achieved,"2 but unfortunately only at the expense of clarity and uniformity."
However, in the principal case, the plaintiff insurer has had no day in court and
the vexatious litigation criticism is not pertinent. Moreover, it is believed that
practical disadvantages would attend the adoption of the majority American
view in this situation.' Hence the court in the instant case decided accurately,
although it is to be regretted that the conclusion was peremptorily reached, for
a thorough, well reasoned opinion, suggesting procedural modification, would
help considerably to point the way to a logical assimilation of the divergent
groups.

LANDLORD AND TEAnrr-RcovERY OF DAMAGES FOR INJURY TO TENANT'S
PROPERTY CAusED By BREACN OF LANDLORD'S AGREEMENT TO REPAiR-Lessor,

having received notice to repair defective roof in accordance with his covenant,
failed to do so, after warning lessee not to rebair, and lessee's goods were damaged by incoming rain. Held, that lessee could recover for damage to his goods.
Gabai v. Krakovitz, 98 Pa. Super Ct.

15o

(1929).

7

See Lloyd, Actirns Arising Out of Injury to Both Persons and Property
In this exposition of the problem the consideration of the taxpayer is suggested as having an important bearing on the
result desired, but the means of effecting it, employed by the American courts,
is not openly affirmed. See also (1928) 6 N. C. L. REV. 345.
'See King v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. C., supra note 6, at 89, 82 N. W. at
(1912) 6o U. OF PA. L. Rav. 531, 544.

1114.

9
It is obvious that this test is not conclusive in every situation for it stands
uncontested that two suits may be brought when different persons are injured
or when the property damaged is not owned by the injured possessor.
o It would seem much simpler to enact procedural remedies compelling the
plaintiff to adjust all of his claims, arising out of a single act of negligence,
in one suit. This would accomplish the desired end and at the same time preserve the uniformity of the substantive law.
'Underwriters at Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., io6 Miss.
244, 63 So. 455 (1913) (cited as authority in the principal case) accepts the
American view of Kimball v. L. & N. R. Co., 94 Miss. 396, 48 So. 230 (09o8)
and then on the strength of the dictum of King v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co.,
supra note 6, gt 89, 82 N. W. at 1114 permits recovery. The confused situation
in Mississippi, where a man with a single right may assign one and retain one
for himself, illustrates the unfortunate result of the American view.
'Judge Ross, in the dissent of the instant case, supports the American view,
arguing that the insurance company may protect itself by interpleading in the
insured's suit for personal injuries. This suggestion seems to be predicated
on either the hope for Utopian co-operation between client and company or the
desire to force insurance companies to preserve Argus-eyed vigilance to defend
their pocketbooks. The result, it is believed, would be indirectly to impose
financial burdens on those from whom such burdens are intended to be taken
by the contended view.

RECENT CASES
The confusion in the cases dealing with the problem of the principal case,'
and the hyper-fine distinctions made therein, call for classification. One line
of cases, following the general rule of damages in actions ex contraau, rigidly
asserts the landlord's non-liability for injury to the lessee's property caused by
breach of the landlord's covenant to repair.2 Such damages, it is said, are
too remote, and not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
entering the agreement; or, again, they are consequential and indirect
No
special astuteness is necessary to observe the fallacy of such reasoning" It is
also argued that recovery, if any, is to be based on the contract to repair, and
the contract alone. Further, these cases abound with the feeling and periphrases
that the tenant is in contributory fault-although not expressed ipsis verbiin remaining in possession with knowledge of the defect; r they hold it to be the
tenantes duty to make repairs and charge the cost thereof to the landlord.'
The result of the principal case," apart from the special fact of the landlord's
warning to the lessee, is followed in another array of cases,' some of which deny
that remaining on the premises with knowledge of the defect tinges the
tenant's conduct with negligence,' or that the tenant is under a legal duty
to repair." The landlord's liability may be grounded in negligence, the
contract to repair being a matter of inducement from which arises the
'As to personal injuries to tenant, see (1927)

courts should make no difference between the two, I
TENANT (1910) § 87.

14 V.

L. REv. 61. The

TrFANY, LANDLORD AND

2Bowling v. Carroll, 122 Ark. 23, 182 S. W. 514 (1916) ; Hendry v. Squier,
126 Ind. 19, 25 N. E. 830, 9 L. R. A. 798 (189o) ; cf. Rumberg v. Cutler, 86
Conn. 8, 84 Atl. iO7 (1912) ; Guynn v. Tremont Hotel Co., 75 Ind. App. 647,
129 N. E. 336 (1921).
*Cases cited supra note 2.
'The problem is: are these damages too remote? Merely to call them
remote is to talk magic. To affirm what one seeks to prove, proves nothing.
Further, it does not seem that such damages are remote, for the lessee contracted to have the hole in his roof repaired, not for asthetic reasons, but to
protect his property.
'Rose v. Butler, 69 Hun 140, 23 N. Y. Supp. 375 (1893); see Cook v.
Soule, 56 N. Y. 420, 423 (1874). In Cohen v. Krumbein, 28 Ga. App. 788, 113
S. E. 58 (1922), the court applied the rule of comparative negligence.
"Aliter where the tenant cannot make repairs for economic reasons or
otherwise, Buck v. Rodgers, 39 Ind. 2 (1872).
7But even under this view notice of the defect to the landlord is a condition
precedent, and the landlord has a reasonable time within which to make repairs,
Bowling v. Carroll, supra note 2; I TAYLOR, LANDLORD AND TENANT (8th ed.
1904) § 330; (1925) i6o LAW TIMEs 316.
"Chamber v. Belmore Co., 33 Cal. App. 78, 164 Pac. 404 (1917) ; Miller v.
Sullivan, 77 Kan. 252, 94 Pac. 266 (19o8); Mason v. Howes, 122 Mich. 329,
81 N. W. 111 (1899); Rife v. Reynolds, 137 Mo. App. 29o, 117 S. W. 652
(19o9); Security Co. v. Kallis, 1O2 Misc. 693, 169 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1918);
Ingram v. Fred, 243 S. W. 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
'Mason v. Howes, Ingram v. Fred, supra note 6. A fortior, this is true
where the landlord, after notice, has made an additional promise to repair,
Kreppelt v. Greer, 218 S. W. 354 (Mo. 192o); Miller v. Sullivan, supra note
6. This fact plus the lessor's warning to the lessee appears to be the ratio
decidendi of the principal case. For analogous situations in the law, see Bohlen,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 447.

" "It was not the duty of the tenant to cause the repairs to have been
made," Vandergrift v. Abbott, 75 Ala. 487, 491 (1883). Accord: Spencer
v. Hamilton, 113 N. C. 49, 18 S. E. 167 (i8g3).
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affirmative duty' to take care.' Shading away into both these contrary poles
is found still a third view, which holds it to be the tenant's duty to make those
repairs which are "trifling" and charge them to the landlord'
The view of the
second group of cases mentioned above, allowing recovery for special damages,
seems the preferable one, for such reverent tenderness towards the landlord who
has brought about the whole difficulty by committing a breach of his contract,
diverts liability from its proper channel, shielding itself behind threadbare legal
formulas.
PRAcricE OF LAw-DRAFTiNG OF WILLS AND TRusT DEc.nxRATiosAcmvrrs

OF

BANKS

AND

TauST ComPANIEs-Proceedings were instituted by

the Idaho Bar Association for an order on defendant Trust Company to show
cause why it should not be cited for contempt of court, in that it held itself out
as qualified to draft wills and trust declarations, and was thus, in violation of
statute, practicing law, without a license. Held, that such activities constituted
the practice of law, and were therefore, prohibited by statute, if carried on without license. In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co., 288 Pac. 157 (Idaho
1930).
While it has been uniformly held that the "practice of law" is not a natural
right,' but a privilege or franchise,' bestowable at the discretion of the state and
subject to state control,' the statutes which confer this privilege are not uniform
in the terminology used' to designate the privilege thus granted; and even in
those which use the expression "practice of law," 5 there is no precise concept of
'This duty is a non-delegable one, so that the landlord is liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor in making repairs, (1929) 77 U. OF
PA. L. Rav.
9ig.
'Baron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 1o4 N. W. 289 (io5), (injury to
person); see 3 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLIGENIcE (6th ed. 1913)
§ 7o8a; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAv OF TORTS (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 227.

This

would seem to harmonize with two well established principles of law; the one,
that a contract may so bring two people together as to create a duty of care
in the one towards the other-Marshall v. R. R., x C. B. 655 (i851); the
other, that affirmative action is asked of those that receive a consideration.
As to the latter, see the masterly article by Bohlen, Basis of Affirmative Obli,gations in. the Law of Torts (1905) 53 U. OF PA. L. REv. 2o9.
'Johnson v. Inman, 134 Ark. 345, 203 S. W. 836 (i9i8); Woodward v.
Jones, I5 Misc. 1, 36 N. Y. Supp. 775 (i896). Where, however, the tenant
is unable to make repairs, the courts should follow Buck v. Rodgers, supra
note 6.
2 Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293, 317 (1863) ; In. re Durant, 8o Conn. 14o, 147,
67 AtI. 497, 5o (i907) ; In re Goldstein, 22o App. Div. io7, 22o N. Y. Supp. 473
(1927) ; In. re Ellis, xi8 Wash. 484, 203 Pac. 957 (1922).
.In re Collins, 188 Cal. 701, 206 Pac. 990 (1922) ; It re Thatcher, i9o Fed.

969 (N. D. Ohio 191I) ; In re Popper, 193 App. Div. 5o5, 184 N. Y. Supp. 4o6
(192o).

re Bailey, So Mont 365, 146 Pac. ioi (I915).
STAT. (Cahill, 1925) c. 13, p. I ("practice as attorney or counsellor at law"); MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) Art. 1o, § I ("practice the profession or perform the services of an attorney") ; DEL. Rav. CODE (1915) 3734,
§ io ("practice as attorneys" in court).
IPA. STAT. (West, i92o) § 851; N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41,
§ 27o; N. J. Comp. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) § 52-214 P.
'In

' ILRLv.
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what amounts to such practice of law. The term undoubtedly includes more
It has been defined by the United
than mere activity before a court of record
States Supreme Court' as covering all professional activity in "legal formalities"; the difficulty, however, is to enumerate such formalities. By way of distinction, it has been suggested that documents which the average business man
could competently draw, should not be included,8 but courts have held it within
the exclusive province of a licensed attorney to engage in the business of drawing
bills of sale and mortgages,' of negotiating for the release of a prisoner," or of
preparing papers of incorporation." The principal case is consistent with these
decisions, for whatever may be one's personal rights' to perform legal services,
when such performance amounts to a business," no valid reason excepts it from
the -ban on unlicensed practitioners. Although, in support of a contrary view, it
has been argued that history and custom sanction the activities of conveyancers,
title companies, and trust organizations," and though these practices by laymen
for remuneration have been judicially noticed and upheld as lawful,' still it is
impossible to ignore the obvious fact that these statutes regulating admissions
to the Bar were, for the most part, passed to prevent such usurpations by the
unlicensed. The decision of the principal case, however, is of importance not
only with regard to licensing statutes, which exist in practically all the states,"
but is significant in the light of the notorious fact that, although corporations
7
being unable to possess the fundamental qualifications of the profession, are
incapable of being admitted to the practice of law," yet Banks and Trust ComI Commonwealth v. Barton, 2o Pa. Super. 447 (x9oz) ; In re Duncan, 83
S. C. 186, i89, 65 S. E. 2io, 211 (i909).
Savings Bank v. Ward, Ioo U. S. i95, 199 (879).
'Dunlap v. Lebus, 112 Ky. 237, 65 S. W. 441 (igoi).
'People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 671 (igig).
"In re Duncan, supra note 6. Conr: Bird v. Breedlove, 24 Ga. 623
(858).
"In Matter of Pace, i7o App. Div. 818, 156 N. Y. Supp. 641 (1915). See
as to preparation of contract and bond, Ely v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E.
836 (1893).
"IJ re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co., 288 Pac. 157, 159 (1930).
"People v. Alfani, mtpra note 9.
'For a full discussion of this view, see Note (i92o) 68 U. OF PA. L. REv.
356.
"People v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666
(i919) (although generally regarded as sustaining the view contrary to that in
the principal case, it is to be noted that the court strictly limits its decision to
the facts which disclosed that the defendant had only drawn one or two documents, and these acts were incidental and not ultrca vires to the Trust Company's
charter. In distinguishing People v. Alfani, supra note 9, the court intimates
that an increase in such activities, or performing them as a business would lead
to an opposite decision).
I-THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW (914) § 69.
'7 Good moral character and satisfactory education are the minimum requirements. In re Duncan, supra note 6; Note (1914) 28 A. L. R. 1140.
"THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAv (1914) § 35; In re Cooperative Law Co.,
198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. i5 (igio) ; State v. Merchants Protective Corp., io5
Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (igig).
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panies are universally engaged in activities, which the principal case terms the
"practice of law." It is evident that the effect of the doctrine of the principal
case, wherever approved, will be to deprive such institutions of what now constitutes a considerable portion of their business.

PROPERTY-RIGHT OF OwNER OF LAND ABUTTING ON PUBLIC RoA--HEAT,

PowFR, AND LIGHT LINES AS AN ADDITIONAL SERvrruDE-Complainant, the
owner in fee of land crossed by a public highway, seeks to restrain the respondent, a franchised company, from erecting proposed electric lines for the transmission of heat, power, and light on the public road, claiming that this is an
additional servitude upon his land. By the admitted facts this is a public purpose. Held, that this is not an additional servitude on complainant's land.
Crawford v. Alabama Power Co., 128 So. 454 (Ala. 193o).
A public highway may be used for any purpose for which it is dedicated
without being an additional servitude upon the fee of the abutting owner.' Under
this general rule of law the majority of courts hold that electric wires do
constitute an additional servitude on the fee of the abutting owner, since they
consider the public to have acquired merely a right of passage in the highway
by the dedication, and that any use beyond this is a use for which the abutting
owner is entitled to compensation.? However the minority hold contra, especially
in the case of telegraph and telephone wires,3 and justify their position on the
following two questionable grounds: First, that streets are dedicated in the
furtherance of communication, and any improved means of communication is
held to have been contemplated,' therefore it is as much a proper use of the
highway to send a message by electrical vibrations over the wire as by a letter
in a mail pouch;' second, that the erection of telegraph and telephone wires is
merely a new method of using the old easement which was granted contemplating
'For discussion see Note (1929) 77 U. oF Pa. L. REv. 793.
'For citation of authorities see, CuRIs, LAw oF E.cT.ccTy (1915) §§ 284,
285; 2 ELLIoT, ROADS AND STTS (4th ed. 1926) § 894; K AsBRY, ELcTRmic

WisS (2d ed. i9oo) § 89.

'For citation of authorities see, CURTIS, op. cit. supro note 2, §§ 284, 286;
2 E.Lorr, op. ci. supra note 2, § 893; K.AsBY, op. cit. supra note 2, § go.
"'This as a matter of fact, is in most cases a very violent presumption, but
to presume that the use of our highways by telegraph and telephone companies
was contemplated when they were established, does still more violence to the
facts." 2 ELuoT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 894.
'Hobb v. Long Distance Tel. and Tel., x47 Ala. 393, 41 So. 10o3 (19o6).
Contra: Eels v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 143 N. Y. 133, 38
N. E. 2m (I894) ; see Nicoll v. N. Y. & N. J. Telephone Co., 62 N. J. 733, 736,
42 Atl. 583, 584 (1899), wherein it says "the resemblance between this use and
that ordinarily enjoyed under the easement merely goes beneath the words by
which it may be described. In reality the electric current does not use the
highway for passage. It uses the wire, and would be as well accommodated
if the wire were placed in the fields or over the houses. The highway is used
only as a standing place for the structures." See also Halsey v. R. R. Co,
47 N. J. Eq. 380, 393, 2o AtI. 859, 864.

RECENT CASES

the improved use.' In the light of this reasoning it is unconscionable even in
jurisdictions adopting the minority view, to accept the reasoning of the court
in the principal case wherein they say, "the same line of reasoning, therefore
must be held applicable," I as this extends the original analogy of the telegraph
and telephone to include heat, power, and light wires, while it entirely ignores
the fact that there is no similarity between them insofar as a means of communication is concerned. Since it is a public purpose by the admitted
facts, it would be more acceptable to say that on the grounds of public policy
this is not an additional servitude,' rather than to rely upon fallacious logic.'

TAXATION-SITUS OF INTANGIBL.S FOR TAX PuRPosEs-The state of Missouri attempted to place an inheritance tax upon credits of a non-resident, consisting of cash deposited with several Missouri banks, United States coupon bonds
physically present within the state, and certain notes, also within the state,
most of which were executed by residents of Missouri and secured by,liens
upon lands in that state. The same credits had already been taxed by the
owner's domiciliary state. Held, (Justices Holmes, Stone and Brandeis dissenting) that such credits had no taxable situs in Missouri and that the Missouri
statute authorizing the tax contravened the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Baldwin v. Missour , 5o Sup. Ct. 436 (U. S. i93o).
In this decision, the United States Supreme Court reiterates and strengthens
its position taken in the recent case of Farmers Loan v. Minnesota,' advancing
another step in the direction of the abolition of double taxation of intangibles.
Prior to the Farmers Lon case, a tax on intangibles had been allowed in the
state of the debtor's domicile,- in the state in which the tangible evidences of

'Ala. Power Co. v. Christian, 216 Ala. i6o, 112 So. 763 (1927). But see
Eels v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra note 5, at 140, 38 N. E.
at 2o4, wherein it is stated, "this so-called new method is a permanent, continuous and exclusive use and possession of some part of the public highway itself,
and, therefore, cannot be simply a new method of exercising such old public easement"

"Principal case at 457.
'See Hobb v. Long Distance Tel. and Tel., supra; note 5 at 398; 41 So. at
Ioo4; Halsey v. R. R. Co., supra note 5, at 383, 2o Atl. at 86o, stating "the abutter's right is subordinate to that of the public, and so insignificant when contrasted with that of the public, that it has been declared to be practically without
the least beneficial interest" See also 2 Ei.uoT, op. cit. supre note 2, (2d ed.
I900) at 417; KEAsBY, op. cit. supra,note 2, at 135.
'The case makes no mention as to whether the light is to be used to light the
highway or not. If it is, there is ample authority to support the case on this
ground. Meyers v. Hudson County Electric Co., 63 N. J. L. 573, 44 At. 713
(1899) ; Palmer v. Larchmont Electric Co., i58 N. Y. 231, 53 N. E. 1092 (1899);
2 ELuoT, op. cit. spra note 2 § 895 ; KEASBY, op. cit. supra note 2 § 107.
128o U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (I93O).

'Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. '89, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903) (overruled by
Farmers Loan v. Minnesota, ibid.). But cf. state tax on foreign-held bonds, 15
Wall. 3oo (1872).
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credits were physically present,3 and in the state in which the credits were
employed or arose out of a continuing business. Farmers Loan v. Minnesota,
though intimating that intangibles may acquire no situs apart from the owner's
domicile unless they "have become integral parts of some local business,"" held
merely that credits were not taxable at the debtor's domicile. But the present
holding molds into law the dictum of the former case, inasmuch as the credits
were physically present in the taxing state' and a portion secured by liens on
realty therein.7 The decision still leaves undecided whether credits having a
"business situs" can again be taxed at the domicile of the owner 8 But in view
of the intimation of the court in Safe Deposit Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia,' it
would not be surprising if, in the future, the application of the fiction mobilia
sequuntur personam is limited to cases in which intangibles have not acquired
a "business situs," in which latter event, a solution may be reached by an analogy
to the case of tangible property. °

TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-EQUITABLE

INROAD UPON THE RIGHTS OF

SURVIVING TENANT-Husband murdered his wife and thereupon committed
suicide. Wife's administrator brings a bill in equity to have husband's administrator declared a constructive trustee of one-half of certain bank deposits
'Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct 607 (914); cf. Scottish
Union and National Insurance Co. v. Bowland, i96 U. S. 61I, 25 Sup. Ct 345
(1905).
'Bristol v. Washington, 177 U. S.133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585 (igoo) ; State Board
of Assessors v. Comptois National D'Escompe, 191 U. S.388, 24 Sup. Ct. io9
(1903) ; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U. S.346, 31 Sup. Ct.
550 (1911) ; See Powell, Business Situs of Credits (192) 28 W. VA. L. J.89.
SuPra note i at 2o9, 5o Sup. Ct at ioi. Since the bonds in that case were
physically outside the taxing state, it was unnecessary for the court to lay down
the rule so broadly.
'In Wheeler v. Sohmer, supra note 3, a transfer tax on notes of a nonresident located in a safe deposit box in the state was sustained, even though
made and secured by mortgages on realty in another state. It is interesting
to note that Justice McKenna, though doubting the validity of a property tax,
concurred on the grounds that it was a transfer tax. The facts of the principal
case present a stronger argument for the validity of the tax since the credits
were secured by liens on realty within the taxing state. Hence Wheeler v.
Sohmer, though not specifically overruled, can apparently no longer be regarded
as law.
7Cf. Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah, 169 U. S. 42I, 18 Sup.
Ct. 392 (i8985 where a tax on a non-resident mortgagee's interest in land lying
within the state was sustained, even though by the law of the taxing state the
mortgagee
had only an equitable interest
8
Prior to Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S.83, 5o Sup.
Ct. 59 (1929), it was never doubted that the fact that intangibles may have a
taxable situs elsewhere did not interfere with the right of the owner's domiciliary
state again to tax them.
'Ibid.; Note (193o) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 532.

" See Nossaman, The Fourteenth Amendment in its Relation to State Taxtion of Intangibles (i93o) i8 CALw. L. REv. 345.
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held by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, for the benefit of the
wife's heirs. Held, that the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought. Barnett v. Couey, 27 S. W. (2d) 757 (Mo. 1930).'
It has been the settled law for centuries that a tenancy by the entirety, being
founded on the legal unity of husband and wife, vests per tout et non per my,
and the survivor takes the whole, not by the fact of survivorship, but by the
original grant 2 Even in the case of property held by one person, the better
view is that a devisee, legatee, or heir who murders his testator, nevertheless
In such cases, however, courts
acquires the legal title at the latter's death
usually apply equitable principles and hold the murderer a constructive trustee
for the heirs of his victim. Though the principle of constructive trust has
often been thus applied where the wrongdoer actually obtains legal title to the
property by his wrong,' the principal case and the two cited in accord with
it' show a tendency to go further and apply the same principle to tenancies
by the entirety even though, in legal theory, the death of one tenant gave the
other no interest in the property that he did not possess before. The application of the equitable rule undoubtedly produces a just result in such a situation, but, clearly, it amounts to a repudiation of the common law principle
that a tenant by the entirety takes the whole at the time of the grant and receives no accretion at the death of his spouse. In view of the abolition of
tenancy by the entirety in many jurisdictions ' and the weakening of them in
others, it is of especial interest that in a jurisdiction which, like Pennsylvania, still gives this estate its full common law recognition,8 the court in the
principal case is willing to invalidate the concept where that concept prevents the application of well-established equitable principles.
1Accord: Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372,, 137 S. E. I88 (1927); Van
Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918). Contra: Bed-

dingfield
v. Estell and Newman, x18 Tenn. 39, 100 S. W. io8 (19o6).
2
Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa. 397 (1856) ; Co. LiTT. i87b; 2 BL Comm. *182;
2 KENT. COMM.

*132.

'Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. i8o, io6 N. E. 785 (914); Carpenter's
Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 At1. 637 (1895); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb.
646, 59 N. W. 935 (1894); Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire Title by his
Crime" (197) 36 AM. L. REG. (N. S.) 225.
'Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896); Ames, op.
cit. supra note 3; I PERRY,

TRUSTS AND

TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929), 3o9; 3

(4th ed. 1918) 24II.
ISorenson v. Nielson, 240 N. Y. Supp. 250 (1930) ; I PERRY, op. cit. supra
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note 4; 3 PomERoY, op. cit. supra note 4 at 2370; ibid. 2404.
6

Supra note I.
Directly, by statutes turning tenancies by the entirety into tenancies in
common, see Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 3o2 (1869) ; indirectly, by married
women's property acts, Donegan v. Donegan, io3 Ala. 488, 15 So. 823 (1894);
Shapiro, Estates by Entirety (1913)
8

61 U. OF PA. L. REv. 476.

Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, et at., 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. W. 67
(i918); Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 AUt. 953 (1912); (930) 78 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 572.
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was injured by one of defendant's trains at a highway crossing where defendant voluntarily maintained a watchman. The watchman failed to give warning of the approach of the train. Held, that there was a breach of the duty
owed to the plaintiff as one of the members of the public who bad come to
rely upon the services of the watchman. Erie R. Co. v. Stewart, 4o F. (2d)
855 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).

When the presence of a watchman at a railroad crossing is required by
statute' or by ordinance, failure to observe the requirement is generally held
to constitute negligence per se. It is often stated that the duty owed to
travellers who know of and rely upon the presence of the watchman at the
crossing is the same when the watchman's services are voluntary, as when
they are required by statute or by ordinance.' Such a statement is too broad
however. The duty imposed by law continues until it is ended by law, whereas
the duty arising from the voluntary maintenance of a watchman ceases upon
the giving of reasonable notice of the watchman's withdrawal.! Subject to
this qualification however, the duty remains. What is its basis? Clearly it
does not arise out of statute, or out of contract. It is generally stated that
the duty arises out of the assurance of safety which the absence of a signal
from a watchman at a crossing where one has been regularly stationed gives.'
This seems to be the correct explanation, and since there can be no assurance
of safety towards persons who know nothing of the employment of the watchman, it follows that as to these, there is no duty to continue the service or
give notice of its discontinuance. Thus limited, the duty is a reasonable
one. It recognizes that the interest in freedom from bodily injury is more
important than the slight inconvenience which notice entails. It imposes
no harsh burden upon the railroad, particularly since the railroad's affirmative
act has created the necessity of such notice.
'Hover v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 17 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 8th,
1927).

'Schell v. DuBois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N. E. 664 (i916).
'Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Actions (1914) 27 HAxv. L.

REv.

317.
'Dolph v. N. Y., N. H. and Hartford R. Co., 74 Conn. 538, 5i At. 525
Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Wright, 120 Ill. App. 218 (1905); (1925)
74 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 178.
' TORTS ]RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 183 (f).
6
Dolph v. N. Y., N. H. and Hartford R. Co., supra: note 4; Rhode v.
Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 86 Wis. 309, 56 N. W. 872 (1893) ; 3 ELmoIt,
RAmROADs (3d ed. i92i) § i65i; 2 SHrEAAX AND REDFnnx,
NGLIGENCE
(6th ed. 1913) § 466. An analogous situation exists where a landlord makes
gratuitous repairs for his tenant, and it is his duty to take care lest he should
mislead his tenant into the belief that the work has been well done, and the
premises made safe for use, BomEN, STUDIEs IN THE LAW OF TORTS, (1926)
223, n. 28.
(i9o2);

